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Introduction 
The last decade has seen the rise of health security on the international agenda which also 
brought about a transformation of the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) role in global 
health governance. The WHO’s growing autonomy in disease surveillance and its successful 
performance in containing the 2003 SARS outbreak launched a vivid debate as to whether we 
are witnessing the transition to a post-Westphalian order in global health. Especially the revised 
International Health Regulations (IHR) have been analyzed as a shift of public health authority 
to the supranational level (Fidler, 2004; Zacher and Keefe, 2008). In the meantime however, 
many scholars have questioned this shift, emphasizing that states retain ultimate control over 
the WHO’s competencies and that state-level implementation remains crucial for enacting 
global health security (Davies, 2008; Kelle, 2007). In addition, the WHO’s donor-driven and 
fragmented structure puts into question its organizational autonomy (Graham, 2013; author 1, 
2013). Hence, scholars of global health security have come to assert that mechanisms of state 
control may prevent the WHO from effectively securing global public health (Kamradt-Scott, 
2011).  
On the other hand, the aftermath of the 2009 H1N1 (“swine flu”) outbreak saw a highly critical 
debate about the WHO’s decision-making during the crisis. For the first time in its history, the 
WHO had declared a so-called Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). 
Assisted by a secret Emergency Committee, the Director-General issued pandemic alerts and 
 
 
recommendations which pressured states to purchase large amounts of vaccines. Many states 
in fact ceded to this pressure (Deshman, 2011: 1095-1096). As the crisis passed and the 
outbreak turned out to be rather mild, journalists, state representatives and European 
parliamentarians criticized the intransparent procedures on which the WHO had based its 
decisions, and allegations of corporate capture were raised and discussed in various forums. 
Hence, in the wake of this international health emergency the WHO displayed competencies 
that were far more consequential than the vision of a toothless UN bureaucracy would have us 
assume.  
How do these two faces of the WHO – dependent and state-driven versus discretionary and 
unaccountable – go together? In this essay we propose to analyze the WHO’s emergency 
governance as a globalized variant of exceptionalism. Drawing on securitization research and 
legal theories of the exception, we argue that the WHO’s emergency governance is marked by 
a bureaucratic decisionism that can itself become a driver of securitization. Emergency 
governance by international organizations (IOs) is different from state-level exceptionalism in 
that it lacks direct enforcement capacities. However, based on the language of global security, 
focal and centralized IOs emerge as authoritative actors whose decisions shape how emerging 
threats are governed. Same as the presentation of a problem as a threat to national security that 
amplifies executive discretion at the state level, the securitization of transboundary risks may 
also strengthen the supranational authority of IOs. What is more, other than emergency politics 
in constitutional democracies, global exceptionalist authority is not embedded in a system of 
institutional constraints or a critical public sphere and thus lacks the constitutional framework 
that controls emergency politics at the domestic level. To contain the potential emergency trap 
that this constellation entails, we hold that IO decisionism needs to be checked by constitutional 
constraints beyond the state. Transparency and institutional checks can inhibit an IO’s capture 
by special interest and make its crisis decisions accountable to its global addressees.  
 
 
Our analysis of the WHO’s emergency powers sheds a new light on the transformation of 
political authority in the wake of securitization. It contributes to the debate on the ambiguous 
effects of securitization in global health, which confers political priority on matters of disease 
and human vulnerability, but can also open the door to illiberal measures (e.g. Elbe, 2006; Lo 
Yuk-ping and Thomas, 2010; McInnes and Rushton, 2013). While many authors have stressed 
how health securitization empowers states (e.g. Davies, 2008; Enemark, 2009; Kamradt-Scott 
and McInnes, 2012), we lay emphasis on the institutional side-effects of securitization at the IO 
level.  In doing so, we seek to bring insights from constitutional theory to critical security 
studies and discuss the complex interplay between securitization and emergency governance. 
We highlight not only the slippery slope that IO emergency powers provide for further 
securitizations, but also discuss ways of institutionally containing global emergency politics. 
This approach has implications for discussions about desecuritization, too. It introduces 
containment as a constitutional complement or alternative to discursive de-securitization 
strategies (cf. Hansen, 2012).  
To make these arguments, the article proceeds in four main steps. We first lay out how the 
constitutional perspective on securitization can be used for the analysis of IO emergency 
governance. The following three sections spell out the components of this argument and apply 
it to the WHO case. We analyze the WHO’s empowerment through the securitization of 
infectious disease in the SARS crisis and then go on to describe the institutionalization of its 
emergency powers as a slippery slope leading to further securitization in the swine flu case. 
Finally, we reconceptualize desecuritization for the context of IO emergency politics. We 
conclude with a discussion of the analytical implications of our argument and map avenues for 
further research on global emergency politics in other IOs such as the United Nations Security 
Council or the European Union. 
 
 
 
Securitization and the global governance of security 
In its classic formulation by Ole Waever, securitization has been problematized precisely 
because of the raison d’état that is inscribed into the concept of security (Waever, 1995). 
Securitization is based on speech acts, usually by political elites, whereby political challenges 
and challengers are made into existential threats to the community, meaning: the state. 
Securitizing speech acts invoke ‘[u]rgency; state power claiming the legitimate use of 
extraordinary means; a threat seen as potentially undercutting sovereignty, thereby preventing 
the political “we” from dealing with any other questions’ (Wæver, 1995: 51). The politics of 
security is intrinsically linked to the state and the logic of ‘war’ where all concerns other than 
victory or defeat recede into the background (Waever, 1995: 53-54; see Buzan et al., 1998: 24).  
As Michael C. Williams (2003) has pointed out, this conceptualization of security is implicitly 
underpinned by the writings of Carl Schmitt, the most influential and controversial legal theorist 
of the state of exception. Not only does the construction of existential threats to the political 
community reflect Carl Schmitt’s vision of politics as based on a friend-enemy distinction 
(Huysmans, 1998; Schmitt 2007 [1932]). In addition, the ‘extraordinary means’ that 
securitization legitimizes echo the sovereign command of the exception for which Schmitt’s 
theory of the state is notorious (Schmitt, 2005 [1922]). The danger of ‘security’ as understood 
by the Copenhagen School is that it allows governments to suspend legal constraints and 
democratic principles in the name of security.  
This critical view on securitization has fuelled a rich and multifaceted research program on the 
widening of security speech.1 Scholars have scrutinized the construction of threats through 
speech acts (Balzacq, 2005; Salter, 2008) but also by other means such as visual representations 
(Williams, 2003; Hansen, 2011) or seemingly banal bureaucratic practices (Huysmans, 2011). 
	
1 For overviews see McDonald (2008) and the 2011 special issue of Security Dialogue (Gad and Petersen, 2011).  	
 
 
The complementary question has also been examined, namely how securitization can be 
avoided or reversed politically, i.e. how desecuritization works. Given that the core of 
securitization is the production of friend-enemy antagonisms, desecuritization approaches have 
explored various strategies to overcome this conflictual dynamic (Huysmans, 1998; Roe, 2004; 
Hansen, 2012). Hence, the main focus of securitization research is on asking when and how 
issues come to be regarded as security problems – the political goal being to avoid securityness 
and the looming Schmittian politics (McDonald, 2008; Waever, 2011).  
Yet the downside of this concentration on the (de-)construction of security problems has been 
that the threatening political scenario itself – exceptionalism – has found much less theoretical 
and empirical attention in securitization studies (Bright, 2012: 862-867; Guzzini, 2011: 331–
332). The question of which legal and institutional transformations actually follow from 
securitization, that is, how security is governed, has rarely been addressed explicitly.2 The broad 
idea of ‘extraordinary means’ and Schmittian politics is more often than not treated as a taken-
for-granted implication of securitization (cf. McInnes and Rushton, 2013). Essentializing the 
nexus between securitization and exceptionalism may underline the critical thrust of the 
Copenhagen tradition but misses important insights into the dynamic interplay between 
securitization and emergency governance. We therefore suggest complementing the analytical 
focus on the (de-)constructivist dimension of securitization (left axis in figure 1) with an 
examination of the constitutional dimension of securitization, namely its implications for the 
constitution of political authority in the governance of emergencies (right axis in figure 1).  
 
 
	
2 But see Aradau (2004) for a discussion of the procedural and policy dimensions of exceptionalism. See also 
White (2013).  
 
 
	
Figure 1: The constitutional dimension of securitization  
	
 
 
 
 
This analytical move helps disentangling the notions of securitization and exceptionalism and 
thereby specifying the grammar of emergency that is implicit in the ‘grammar of security’ 
(Buzan et al., 1998: 33). Drawing on post-Schmittian discussions about exceptionalism in legal 
theory, we propose three theoretical contributions to securitization research which become 
visible only with an eye on its constitutional dimension.  
First, by reconstructing the logic of emergency governance in general terms we contribute to 
disentangling exceptionalism from the ‘state’. While the securitization of national but also of 
international threats is mostly associated with a (re-)nationalization of the emergency response 
mechanisms (Enemark, 2009; Kamradt-Scott and McInnes, 2012), we argue that the 
securitization of international problems may equally lead to the internationalization of 
emergency governance. Against the Schmittian fixation on state sovereignty, we hold that 
exceptionalism is located at different levels of political authority. As Roxanne Doty has shown, 
exceptionalism is a general figure that can also be invoked in the security practices of 
communities below the state (Doty, 2007). Our article complements this reconceptualization by 
analyzing how the politics of emergency is playing out beyond the state, i.e. at the level of 
international organizations. Where global security crises require rapid and centralized 
decisions, exceptionalist authority can also migrate to the supranational level of IOs and their 
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executive organs. This empowerment consists chiefly in decisionist political authority to 
determine the existence of an emergency situation and to define the measures required to 
counter the threat without being constrained by law. Even though it is not backed up by direct 
enforcement capacities, IO decisionism sets the agenda for state behavior in times of crises as 
well as for further securitizations.  
Thus secondly, we conceptualize what we call the ‘emergency trap’ of global security. We argue 
that the securitization-exceptionalism link is not static but inherently dynamic and creates self-
reinforcing tendencies. In taking the legal and institutional consequences of securitization 
seriously, it becomes visible that the logic of emergency is not only a transient mode of political 
decision-making but also generates lasting institutional effects. Especially, exceptionalism is 
connected to an empowerment of the executive in the political system in order to counter the 
portrayed security threat. Such institutional transformations make it easier to reactivate the 
language of security and emergency and thereby to securitize further issues. Thus, there is a 
tendency to perpetuate the state of security via the institutionalization of emergency politics. 
We will show that this trap is not only a national (autocratic) phenomenon but can be triggered 
at the IO level due to the relative lack of public control and institutional checks beyond the 
state. 
Thirdly, we suggest a constitutional alternative to the Copenhagen School’s approach to 
desecuritization. While the latter starts from the assumption that securitization means the end 
of politics and therefore suggests discursively scaling down the threat construction (e.g. Roe, 
2004), our critical reconstruction of global emergency governance shows that the jump from 
securitization to exceptionalism itself is not essential but contestable and can thus be subjected 
to constitutional checks on sovereign authorities. As the constitutionalist discussion of the state 
of exception teaches us, institutional checks can be installed to break the vicious circle between 
securitization and emergency governance (e.g. Scheuermann, 2006). Other than the strategy of 
 
 
discursive desecuritization, i.e. the undermining of threat constructions, this conception brings 
into play constitutional means of containing the effects of securitization such as legal review 
and the separation of powers.  
In the following we spell out each of these arguments in more detail and use them to make sense 
of the WHO’s emergency governance in global health.  
 
Global health emergencies and the empowerment of the WHO 
How can securitization reshape political authority beyond the nation-state? In this section we 
conceptualize this link through an analytical transfer of emergency politics to the IO level. We 
use our insights to make sense of the formation and institutionalization of decisionist authorities 
in the WHO that were catalyzed by its handling of SARS.   
 
Global emergencies, global exceptionalism 
At the national level, the state of emergency is the legal order through which sovereign states 
respond to security crises. States of emergency constitute an exceptional type of government 
that follows a distinct logic. First, they are marked by the time pressure and urgency that 
security invokes. This implies the idea that slow democratic procedures need to be bypassed 
where rapid reactions are needed (see Aradau, 2004). Second, given the unanticipated, 
‘exceptional’ nature of existential threats, law has to recede in order to facilitate decisions that 
reestablish political order. As Carl Schmitt has formulated most pointedly, there ‘exists no rule 
that is applicable to chaos. For a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and 
he is sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation actually exists’ (Schmitt, 
 
 
2005 [1922]: 13). Assuming that security crises cannot be dealt with through democratic 
process or based on ex ante legislation, they require the decisionism of a political sovereign.  
The emergency mode of politics, while originally theorized for the nation state, can nowadays 
also be observed at the global level (author 2, 2012; author 2, 2013). Especially with the 
globalization discourse, security threats are increasingly seen as worldwide contingencies that 
do not respect national boundaries. Environmental disasters, terrorist attacks, financial 
breakdowns or globalized pandemics are some of the prototypical crisis scenarios where high-
speed decision-making and rapid political interventions are asked for. A leading protagonist of 
this ‘planetary state of exception’, the sociologist Ulrich Beck (2009), claims that contemporary 
economic, ecologic or other risks create a ‘global community of threats’ and a radical 
uncertainty regarding future catastrophes. This should lead the world to ‘enforced 
enlightenment’, i.e. to worldwide cooperation in the combat of worldwide risks (Beck, 2009: 
8, 47). Put differently, it is held that ‘transboundary crises’ demand transboundary responses 
(Boin and Rhinard, 2008: 7).  
In global crisis situations where time pressure is high and rapid decisions are needed, a turn to 
IOs becomes a natural solution due to both their centralization and their expertise. The 
centralization of governance competencies within IOs (Abbott and Snidal, 1998) allows for 
timely reactions to urgent threats. Indeed, the supranational authority of IOs, i.e. their ability to 
govern via majority or bureaucratic decisions, has considerably grown over the last century 
(Zürn et al., 2012). In addition, their expert authority and perceived neutrality (Barnett and 
Finnemore, 2004: 24-25) endows IOs with the legitimacy to take rapid decisions in the face of 
imminent threats. Hence, just like in the national context, a global politics of emergency can 
lead to an empowerment of the executive – in this case not of national governments, but of the 
executive organs within IOs.  
 
 
However, global emergency governance is also structurally different from the prototypical state 
of exception at the domestic level. Most importantly, states can rely on their monopoly of force 
and thus revert to a police force in order to give effect to their emergency measures. By contrast, 
IO authority is (mostly) not backed by coercive power and therefore relies on member states’ 
deference to its measures. It mainly consists of the transfer of decisionist authority. The impact 
of IO decisions, especially in times of crisis and uncertainty, should not be underestimated 
though. IO decisions and recommendations contribute to setting the international agenda and 
legitimize certain behaviors while delegitimizing others. This will become evident in the 
WHO’s reaction to SARS and H1N1, too. In the following we reconstruct the formation of its 
authority to combat global health threats with exceptional means. 
 
SARS and the WHO’s decisionist authority 
Although the WHO is the focal international organization in global disease surveillance and 
control, its authority in this domain was rather limited until the 1990s (author 1, 2014). Its main 
legal instrument, the so-called International Health Regulations (IHR), only covered a small 
and predefined set of ‘quarantinable’ diseases such as cholera, plague, and yellow fever. 
Moreover, under the old IHR the WHO could only become active and issue recommendations 
when states reported outbreaks – a duty that member states often did not comply with due to 
prestige concerns or fears of economic losses (Fidler, 2005: 335-336). This factual national veto 
made the IHR a rather toothless instrument (Zacher and Keefe, 2008: 40-41). 
This only changed over the 1990s as concern about ‘emerging’ and ‘reemerging’ infectious 
diseases was growing – first among US health authorities and increasingly also in global bodies 
such as the WHO (Abraham, 2011; Kamradt-Scott, 2010: 77). As the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
continued to spread and global interconnectedness fuelled fears of rapid global contagion, 
 
 
attention shifted from known diseases to the unlimited potential threats residing in the microbial 
world (Weir and Mykhalovsky, 2010: 61–62). At the same time, new communication 
technologies began to liberate the WHO from the national veto, as they facilitated the private 
and decentralized reporting of disease outbreaks. Thus unofficially, the WHO began to draw on 
outbreak reports issued by internet-based professional networks and used them for monitoring 
purposes in its Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN; see Fidler, 2005: 347). 
Officially, a debate was launched in the mid-1990s on how to make the IHR a viable crisis 
response tool. The WHO secretariat developed proposals to extend the coverage of the IHR 
toward all possible ‘public health emergencies of international concern’ (WHO, 2002). 
However, given the complexity involved in finding ex ante regulations for unknown diseases 
the reform debate remained stuck until the new millennium. Various techniques for determining 
which disease posed an emergency threat proved inadequate, and likewise any ex ante 
specification of the recommendations the WHO could make in case of an outbreak remained 
extremely vague (Burci and Vignes, 2004: 139). The breakthrough in these negotiations only 
came with the emergence of SARS in 2002/3 and the WHO’s exceptional decisions in its 
handling of the crisis. 
SARS, a so far unknown form of pneumonia, first emerged in China in November 2002 and 
spread toward 32 states within several months (Kamradt-Scott, 2011: 802). Though SARS was 
not highly contagious, those infected had a rather high probability of being killed by the new 
pathogen (Doshi, 2009: 605). Despite the initial denial by Chinese authorities the WHO was 
soon informed about the outbreak through non-state sources (Heymann and Rodier, 2004: 190). 
The WHO secretariat activated its alert network to coordinate worldwide research and 
containment efforts, and in March 2003 issued a first global alert. Director-General Gro Harlem 
Brundtland publicly declared SARS a ‘worldwide health threat’ (WHO 2003).  
 
 
The measures that the WHO took on the basis of this securitization are well reported and have 
been described as ‘agency slack’, given that they exceeded the WHO’s formal mandate in 
several respects (Cortell and Peterson, 2006). The WHO response was exceptional, first, 
because the organization publicly shamed states who did not comply with the recommendations 
and guidelines prepared by the WHO (Loh et al., 2004). This authoritative behavior broke with 
the established practice of the WHO not to publicly criticize member states. In particular the 
Chinese government was vividly criticized for suppressing information on the outbreak 
(Kamradt-Scott, 2011: 804). Secondly, beginning in April 2003 the WHO issued explicit travel 
warnings for the most affected territories in China, Hong Kong and Canada. It had never 
received a mandate to take such measures (Fidler, 2004: 268). However, fearing the economic 
consequences of these alerts, the affected states protested in public, but made parallel efforts to 
fulfill the WHO’s epidemiological criteria to get the warnings and advisories lifted (Heymann 
and Rodier, 2004: 193-194).  
This rupture with established practice has been interpreted differently. Some considered it to be 
a rather narrow transgression (Smith, 2010), others viewed it as a major instance of ‘slack’ 
(Cortell and Peterson, 2006). It has also been argued that the WHO response to SARS may 
legally be justified with a teleological interpretation of the WHO Constitution (Kamradt-Scott, 
2007). What is important for our argument is, first, that the WHO actions were indeed 
considered a rupture requiring a re- regulation of its emergency powers and zone of discretion 
(see Kamradt-Scott, 2011). Secondly, the SARS crisis became the blueprint for the revision of 
the IHR and thus marked a formative turning point in how emergency governance in 
international health was organized. Hence, the re-regulation actually institutionalized the 
WHO’s authority to decide on the exception. 
As SARS was successfully contained by May 2003 and the number of casualties remained 
below 1000, the crisis became a lasting success story for the WHO (Kamradt-Scott 2011: 802). 
 
 
Its exceptional measures were recognized as effective emergency responses and as blueprints 
for the IHR revision process. The WHO secretariat supported this interpretation in a series of 
publications between 2003 and 2004 where it framed SARS as the prototypical new health 
threat: an unpredictable and highly dangerous disease that public health authorities should 
prepare for. In addition, it was emphasized that the WHO’s response had been critical for 
identifying and containing the disease, i.e. that an extension of its competencies was justified 
(WHO Working Group for the Revision of the International Health Regulations, 2004). Indeed, 
the WHO’s member states soon agreed on a codification of the WHO’s emergency powers 
(Zacher and Keefe, 2008: 66). 
The revised International Health Regulations (the ‘IHR 2005’) were adopted in 2005 and 
entered into force in 2007 (WHO, 2008). Rather than a limited list of known diseases, the new 
IHR cover all potential threats to international health. States are required to report disease 
outbreaks and ‘health events’ to the WHO, yet the organization can also draw on non-state 
sources to assess the threat. The ultimate decision whether health events constitute a ‘Public 
Health Emergency of International Concern’ (PHEIC) is delegated to the Director-General who 
‘shall make the final determination on this matter’ (Art. 49 (5)). For determining the beginning 
and termination of the state of emergency as well as the WHO’s ‘temporary recommendations’ 
the Director-General shall take into account the views of an Emergency Committee that the DG 
selects from the IHR expert roster (Art. 47-48). Hence, the revised IHR institute the WHO 
secretariat as the authority that decides on the exception and entitles the DG to shift into a quasi-
autocratic style of decision-making during the state of emergency. In the following section we 
discuss how these authorities were activated in the first PHEIC, the swine flu pandemic, which 
illustrates the dynamic feedback of IO emergency powers on securitization.   
 
 
 
Re-activating emergency powers: securitization in the swine flu case 
The revision of the IHR was only the momentary endpoint of the securitization-emergency 
interplay in global health. Emergency powers are inherently dynamic, creating incentives for 
their perpetuation on the one hand while provoking resistance on the other (see below). In this 
section we focus on the first aspect, the emergency trap that contributed to the securitization 
and governance of the ‘swine flu’ outbreak in 2009.  
 
The slippery slope of global exceptionalism 
In the tradition of Harold Lasswell (1941) social scientists and legal scholars have pondered 
over the so-called ‘ratchet effect’ of emergency powers in national polities. Aaron Friedberg 
(2002: 240) summarizes the position of these scholars: ‘Once undertaken, they note, emergency 
increases in the size of central government bureaucracies, the bulk of the revenues they extract, 
and the range of activities they seek to control are rarely completely reversed.’ Hence, once 
seized emergency powers tend to be institutionalized ex post, perpetuating the increased 
authority of the executive. Arguably, emergencies thus involve the danger that exceptional 
authority becomes the rule (Gross and Ní Aoláin, 2006: 230). This has a further implication, 
namely that enduring exceptionalism also reduces the obstacles and increases the institutional 
incentives for further securitizations. As Rasler and Thompson (1989: 123-124) note, the 
emergency empowerment of executive agencies also widens the opportunity to invoke security-
related justifications for future bureaucratic expansions.    
The ‘autocratic tendencies’ inherent in the institutionalization of exceptional powers have been 
intensely studied at the national level (Questiaux, 1982: 31). These trends point to what we refer 
to as an institutional ‘emergency trap’, the dynamic feedback of emergency powers on 
securitization. Just like in the classic ‘security trap’ of the Copenhagen school (C.A.S.E. 
 
 
Collective, 2006: 460) where the quest for security can lead to the identification of ever more 
insecurities that societies seek to control, the institution of emergency powers does not simply 
put an end to a security crisis. It increases the pressure on executives to become active and 
respond where a looming problem may be viewed as an existential threat. At the same time it 
reduces institutional obstacles to further securitizations and creates incentives for IO executives 
to extend their reach and authority. Thereby, emergency provisions can become a slippery slope 
toward further securitization.   
International organizations are especially vulnerable in this regard because they are not 
embedded in state-like democratic institutions. Even though public scrutiny of international 
institutions seems to increase with the institutions’ political authority (Zürn et al., 2012) 
mechanisms of societal influence and their capacity to act as an effective corrective on IO 
politics remain relatively miniscule (see Gross and Ní Aoláin, 2006: 404). As we will discuss 
in more detail below, there are significantly fewer checks and balances to IO authority than in 
constitutional democracies (see Klabbers, 2007: 161-162). That the tendency of exceptionalism 
to become self-perpetuating also applies in IOs has become evident in the WHO’s response to 
the H1N1 outbreak. 
 
The first Public Health Emergency of International Concern 
The first cases of Swine Influenza A/H1N1 were observed in Mexico in March 2009. By mid-
April, Mexico confirmed more than sixty H1N1-related deaths, and first outbreaks were 
reported from the United States. According to the WHO, this new influenza strain was highly 
concerning not only due to its transboundary spread, but also because of its novelty that 
consisted in an atypical rate of young adult victims and, most importantly, its association with 
 
 
animals.3 On April 25, WHO Director-General Margaret Chan invoked the International Health 
Regulations and declared H1N1 a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) 
thus establishing a considerable amount of discretion for the emergency actions of the WHO 
executive. Like all subsequent WHO recommendations, her decision was based on advice by 
the Emergency Committee that Chan had convened under the IHR. To protect the 16 Committee 
members from outside influence, with the exception of the chair their names were kept secret 
by the WHO, and the Director-General took ultimate responsibility for the WHO’s emergency 
response (Cohen and Carter, 2010: 1278). This response consisted in publishing updates and 
‘temporary recommendations’ and, most importantly, assessing whether swine flu posed an 
existential threat to global health.  
In fact, until June 2009 H1N1 was not fully securitized but declared a potential threat for global 
health security, meaning a potential ‘pandemic’. As Margaret Chan stated in front of the United 
Nations General Assembly on May 4, pandemic flu was an utmost threat to humankind: 
‘Influenza pandemics [imply] that nearly everyone in the world is susceptible to infection. It is 
this almost universal vulnerability to infection that makes influenza pandemics so disruptive.’4 
Yet based on the WHO’s pandemic warning system, by May 2009 H1N1 was still in phase 5 
(imminent pandemic), not the pandemic stadium of phase 6 (pandemic). This was due, first, to 
the fact that the disease had not yet spread beyond the American continent and was thus limited 
to one of the six WHO regions. Second, the established definition of pandemic flu also entailed 
the criterion that it caused ‘enormous numbers of deaths and illness.’ This only changed in early 
May when the severity criterion was discretely removed from the WHO website and ‘pandemic’ 
redefined – without any form of public discussion – to signify the global dispersion of a disease 
(Cohen, 2009). The redefinition allowed the WHO to fully securitize the H1N1 outbreak and 
	
3 See WHO website http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_04_24/en/index.html [accessed March 19, 2013].	
4 See WHO website http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2009/influenza_a_h1n1_situation_20090504/en/ index.html 
[accessed March 19, 2013].	
 
 
declare it a pandemic on June 11, although in terms of severity it did not exceed other seasonal 
influenzas (Deshman, 2011: 1097).5 Based on this move, the WHO activated its pandemic 
preparedness plans and made recommendations that it had prepared for the outbreak of a 
pandemic flu over the preceding decade (Cohen, 2009; Doshi, 2009; Fidler, 2009: 767-768).  
Among the recommendations issued by the WHO, the most consequential were those advising 
countries to order vaccines and antiviral medicines (Cohen and Carter, 2010: 1277; Deshman, 
2011: 1095-1096). These recommendations were not uncontested among public health 
professionals who questioned the severity of the outbreak (Garske et al. 2009), yet in a climate 
of high insecurity and uncertainty such skeptical voices had little impact. Health officials and 
media looked to Geneva where the WHO issued regular updates and policy guidance. While 
developing countries could not afford to order the recommended vaccines, most of the wealthier 
states followed the WHO’s advice.6 In the aftermath of the pandemic, the majority of European 
governments reported that the WHO pandemic alert had been critical for their decision to order 
vaccines (Deshman, 2011: 1096).7 In addition, 22 European governments had signed advance 
purchase agreements with pharmaceutical companies that were contingent on the declaration of 
a pandemic. 11 of these agreements were directly activated by the WHO pandemic alert, forcing 
governments to purchase and stockpile large amounts of vaccines that they ultimately would 
not use (ibid). Only once the crisis had passed critical voices became dominant who questioned 
the WHO’s decision-making. Yet during the emergency, such a debate did not take place and 
	
5 Peter Doshi stated in the British Medical Journal that ‘Since the emergence of novel A/H1N1, descriptions of 
pandemic flu (both its causes and its effect) have changed to such a degree that the difference between seasonal 
flu and pandemic flu is now unclear’ (Doshi, 2009: 603).	
6 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing to this stratified impact of the WHO’s advice. The direct effect 
of influenza securitization was thus limited to affluent countries which can buy and stockpile large amounts 
pharmaceuticals. Indirectly, however, it also harms developing countries by shortening the supply of vaccines 
and antivirals (Elbe, 2010). The WHO’s securitizing moves can thus deteriorate global health inequalities. 
7 Though ex post justifications need to be interpreted with some caution, it is noteworthy that a survey by the 
Health Protection Agency yielded that 17 out of 27 European governments considered the WHO pandemic alert 
the second major trigger of their decision to purchase vaccine – second only after the criterion ‘scientific 
assessments’, which again may have been shaped by WHO assessments (Deshman, 2011: 1096).	
 
 
most governments ceded to the pressure to purchase costly medicines without being able to 
assess the benefit and safety of this medication. 
In sum, the WHO’s first official health emergency (PHEIC) demonstrates that IO emergency 
powers bestow international organizations considerable discretion and authority in times of 
global crisis. During the emergency, the WHO autonomously redefined the term global 
pandemic and was able to exert considerable authority through its recommendations. The swine 
flu case illustrates that IO emergency powers are not only products but also drivers of 
securitization. The WHO’s decisions were taken in an extremely intransparent process that 
facilitated securitization by evading public scrutiny. Only once the Director-General decided in 
August 2010 that H1N1 had entered the post-pandemic period did the WHO publish the names 
of the experts constituting the Emergency Committee. It turned out that many Committee 
members had close ties to pharmaceutical companies that directly benefited from the crisis, 
which led to allegations of conflict of interest against the WHO (Cohen and Carter, 2010). 
These procedural concerns raise the important question of how IO emergency governance can 
be contained and committed to transparent and accountable working methods. In the following 
section we propose a constitutionalist alternative to desecuritization and discuss post-H1N1 
efforts to tame the WHO’s exceptionalism by constitutional means.   
 
 
Constitutional constraints and the management of global emergencies 
The new emergency authorities of the WHO show how IO emergency politics is fuelled by and 
in turn can reinforce securitization at the global level. Yet, same as the construction of a security 
threat, we hold that the exercise and locking in of emergency powers is neither necessary nor 
irreversible. In fact, the degree of decisionism institutionalized in IOs may be determined and 
 
 
contained by constitutional mechanisms of political balancing and legal constraint. We 
therefore argue that constitutional containment is a useful complement to the Copenhagen 
School’s take on desecuritization and a viable strategy to delimit emergency politics in the 
WHO.   
 
A constitutionalist alternative to desecuritization  
Given the specter of exceptionalism coming with security, research in the tradition of the 
Copenhagen School has mostly focused on averting the securitizations that facilitate emergency 
measures (cf. Waever, 2000: 253-254; Roe, 2008). It is claimed that a securitizing move which 
shifts an issue from normal politics into the realm of the exception needs to be countered by an 
explicit desecuritizing move that shifts the issue back to the normal by discursively 
undermining the threat construction (Huysmans, 1995: 65-67; 1998; Roe, 2004: 285-287; 
Hansen, 2012: 542-545).8 This conception of securitization and desecuritization has pointed out 
several ways back to normal politics. However, it also reproduces the categorical belief that 
there are but two possible political forms: ‘Non-security’ – associated with normal politics, and 
‘Security’ – associated with the logic of war (see figure 1). This perspective is constraining 
because non-security not always is an option: On the one hand, desecuritizing moves may 
simply not be successful, because desecuritizers lack discursive authority or because their 
discursive strategies do not resonate with the relevant audiences (see Buzan et. al., 1998: 26). 
On the other hand, non-security may be undesirable due to negative side effects that 
desecuritization can produce, for example by undermining legitimate claims to protect 
vulnerable groups (Roe, 2004). Without an alternative to desecuritization, this would mean to 
let the logic of war unfold.  
	
8 See Aradau (2004) for critical remarks on this approach to desecuritization. 	
 
 
The alternative we want to propose is based on the assumption that there is little reason to accept 
that speaking security necessarily has to result in all-out emergency measures. Paul Roe (2004: 
292-293) has convincingly argued that securitized issues can be managed. While the language 
of security remains present, its effects can be mitigated (see also Tjalve, 2011). As the debate 
on the state of exception among legal theorists shows, there are different ways of 
constitutionally dealing with emergencies that especially foresee the taming of sovereign power 
through constitutional containment (cf. Gross, 2003; Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2004; Dyzenhaus, 
2006; Scheuermann, 2006). For example, what has been termed the ‘accommodation model’ of 
exceptionalism is based on the understanding that it would be unrealistic to think that the 
existing constitutional order could remain completely untouched during times of crisis. It 
nevertheless holds that the basic pillars of the constitution need to be protected and that the 
legal order should therefore have mechanisms ready to keep the emergency within these 
constitutional confines (Gross, 2003: 1043-1044; Ackermann, 2004; Tushnet, 2005). Thus from 
the perspective of legal theory, one important alternative and complement to desecuritization is 
constitutional accommodation (see figure 1). It is an alternative insofar as it mitigates the effects 
of securitizations that cannot be avoided. But it is also a complement to desecuritization because 
it counteracts the tendencies of the emergency trap outlined above, i.e. it removes or mitigates 
a precondition for further securitizations (see also White, 2013: 14-15 for the inverse approach).  
Such confines can be both ex ante and ex post constitutional checks on discretionary powers. 
Ex ante, both the initiation and the scope of emergency measures can be constrained. Regarding 
initiation, Schmittian decisionism whereby the sovereign itself determines the exception can be 
countered by functionally separating the decision on the presence or absence of an emergency 
and the decision on the means to overcome it. This is seen as a fundamental precondition for 
keeping emergency rule ‘constitutional’ (Rossiter, 1948: 299-300). At the IO level, this could 
mean that a member state body or other subcommittee is entitled to formally invoke the state 
 
 
of exception and that only then an IO organ can decide on emergency measures. Regarding 
their scope, the range of available emergency measures can be circumscribed so that the 
sovereign’s discretion does not trespass on elementary rules and rights even in the state of 
emergency.  
In addition, IO emergency powers can be contained ex post with the help of accountability 
mechanisms. As the literature on an emerging Global Administrative Law (GAL) argues, basic 
principles of domestic administrative law and thereby mechanisms of political and judicial 
review can and should be integrated within the international legal system to increase IO 
accountability (cf. Kingsbury et al., 2005).9Accountability can take the form of political review 
whereby an inter-state assembly or executive board watches over IO emergency powers. Legal 
review in turn can be achieved either by a legal counsel or internal review panel that assesses 
the lawfulness of IO actions. In addition, inter-institutional processes of steering and control 
can contribute to reviewing an IO’s deployment of emergency competencies (Kingsbury and 
Casini, 2009: 337). An important side effect of accountability mechanisms is that they enhance 
the transparency and public scrutiny of IO activities. This may also prove a positive feedback 
for desecuritization efforts as it opens the possibility for discursively contesting the securitizing 
moves by IOs.  
 
Constitutional containment in the WHO  
These types of constitutional checks can also be applied to the WHO, and have in part already 
been tapped in the management of its emergency powers. Ex ante checks on the WHO’s 
emergency powers mainly regard the scope of measures that the Director-General can 
	
9 Empirically, it can be observed that today there is a steady albeit uneven trend towards the introduction of 
accountability mechanisms in IOs which are designed to constrain their exercise of authority especially vis-à-vis 
individuals (cf. Heupel, 2013; Heupel et al., forthcoming 2014).	
 
 
recommend during a PHEIC. Indeed, regarding the scope of regulations, the very existence of 
the IHR can be considered as an instrument to contain emergency measures to the necessary 
minimum in order to prevent interference with trade and human liberty (see Zacher and Keefe, 
2008: 6-8). This is reflected in IHR formulations that urge the DG to recommend only necessary 
and evidence-based measures, and, more importantly, the emphasis that the IHR place on 
human rights protection (Art. 3, 32, Art. 45). On the other hand, ex ante checks on the WHO’s 
initiation of emergencies are rather limited.10 As outlined above, the ultimate discretion over 
determining the state of emergency and deciding on the measures to be recommended lies with 
the Director-General. This creates an incentive for the WHO to securitize health issues by 
declaring them a PHEIC. A functional separation of the decision over PHEICs and the decision 
over emergency measures is a constitutional check that has not been considered yet. 
Instead, the constitutional containment of the WHO’s emergency powers has mainly been 
carried out via mechanisms of ex post review. Critics of the 2009 emergency governance thus 
used the strategy of external horizontal review to press for constitutional checks on the WHO’s 
discretion. In fact, in the aftermath of the first PHEIC, the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe has emerged as a horizontal check on the WHO’s executive discretion (cf. 
Deshman, 2011). In early 2010, the Assembly initiated a public inquiry into the WHO’s H1N1 
response which led to the release of a highly critical report entitled ‘The handling of the H1N1 
pandemic: more transparency needed’ (Council of Europe – Parliamentary Assembly, 2010). It 
was followed by the adoption of Resolution 1749 (2010)11 in which the Assembly notes grave 
shortcomings in the decision-making procedures at the WHO when handling H1N1 and calls 
upon the organization to review its terms of reference ‘with a view to ensuring the utmost 
	
10  Adam Kamradt-Scott (2011: 810-811) argues that the Director-General’s obligation under the new IHR to 
consult with concerned states and the Emergency Committee is already a significant check. However, as it is the 
ultimate discretion of the Director-General to declare a PHEIC and decide on countermeasures, this is at best a 
very weak constraint. 
11 Assembly debate on 24 June 2010 (26th Sitting). 	
 
 
transparency and the highest level of democratic accountability regarding public health 
decisions’ (para. 6.1.).  
The public pressure emanating from the Parliamentary Assembly has also affected the work of 
the WHO’s internal review body, the IHR Review Committee that like the Emergency 
Committee consists of members of the WHO Roster of experts and is appointed by the Director-
General (IHR (2005) Art. 50 - 53). The Committee held a series of public sessions including 
hearings of critical external parties. In its report the Committee asserted that there was no direct 
evidence for industry influence on WHO decisions, but nevertheless admonished the WHO’s 
inadequate dealing with conflicts of interests of WHO experts. It also criticized the WHO 
decision to keep secret the names of the Emergency Committee members and recommended 
more transparent procedures for the Committee’s appointment and working methods. 
Regarding the adjustment of pandemic criteria, the WHO’s failure to dispel suspicions of 
arbitrary redefinition was criticized, although the Review Committee suggested that the ad hoc 
changes made by the WHO were in line with the ‘intended’ definition of a pandemic (WHO, 
2011, xx-xxiii).12 In 2012, the World Health Assembly endorsed the findings of the WHO 
investigation and requested the Director-General to report on the implementation of the 
Committee’s recommendations (Deshman, 2011: 1099). These recommendations can be 
expected to shape the WHO’s next handling of a PHEIC.  
The emerging public debate about and review of the WHO’s emergency powers shows that the 
emergency game is not unidirectional. Indeed, the invocation of crisis and security may be 
productive of exceptionalist IO authority. But the emergency impetus may equally well be 
channeled through and contained by properly designed constitutional structures. Hence, the 
	
12 A revised preparedness guideline for pandemic influenza that takes into account the experience of the H1N1 
outbreak was published in 2013 (WHO, 2013).  
	
 
 
outcome of speaking security is not a carved in stone regularity. It can be manipulated and 
contained.  
 
Conclusion  
In this article, we have sought to demonstrate the utility of breaking up the concept of 
securitization and untying the institutional consequences from the act of speaking security. This 
de-essentializing move was made to enable a new perspective on the legal-constitutional 
dimension of securitization: In contrast to accepting the looming exceptional politics as a feared 
but given implication of securitization, we suggested explicating the connection of 
securitization and exceptionalism as a dynamic and contestable relationship. Our focus was 
therefore less on the construction and deconstruction of political problems in terms of security, 
but rather on its effects on political authority in the governance of global emergencies. We have 
used this perspective to make sense of the WHO’s changing role in the governance of global 
health over the past decade.   
Our analysis of the WHO’s role in health security has revealed the intricate interaction between 
IO emergency governance and securitization. Crises exacerbate the transparency and 
accountability deficit of IOs, triggering an emergency trap that facilitates further securitization. 
Importantly, however, IO decisionism is not the same as all-out IO autonomy. In fact, the 
discretionary zone of emergency politics also establishes a zone of informality that  is 
particularly vulnerable to capture – be it corporate capture that many suspected in the H1N1 
case, or be it capture by powerful states who exploit discretionary zones to their benefit (Davies, 
2008; Stone, 2011). Hence, a constitutional containment of IO emergency powers does not 
merely establish checks on IO authority, but also on the influence of powerful states and interest 
 
 
groups in global politics. The normative project of de-securitization here ties into the normative 
project of global health equity. 
While we developed our theoretical arguments in close connection to the empirical observations 
in the WHO case, it is our hunch that this type of global securitization and associated forms of 
global exceptionalism are a more general phenomenon across IOs (see also author 2, 2013). 
Suffice it to hint at the UN Security Council’s role in counter-terrorism after 9/11 or the 
European institutions’ governance of the current financial crisis in the Eurozone: The UNSC 
showed heavily exceptionalist traits when it started blacklisting individuals depriving them of 
their right to a fair hearing and at the same time arrogated the function of world legislature (cf. 
author 2, 2012; Joyner, 2012). The European crisis politics is interspersed with elements of 
autocratic governance at all possible levels, be it the (German-led) European Council’s 
imposition of severe conditionalities, the ECB’s self-authorization to act as lender of last resort 
in apparent violation of EU treaties, or the troika’s ample discretion in monitoring the 
implementation of the European emergency measures (cf. Ruffert, 2011; White, 2013). Against 
this background, we suggest that there is room and need for further research on the relationship 
between securitization and exceptionalism in the crisis politics of international organizations.  
More generally, we hold that the Copenhagen School’s approach to securitization and the legal-
constitutional theory on the state of exception are two complementary research strands that have 
yet to explore the full potential of their mutual engagement. While in this article we attempted 
to demonstrate the value-added for the Copenhagen agenda to integrate insights from legal 
theory, the fertilization should also work the other way round. For example, the legal-
philosophical debate surrounding the state of exception still lacks an appropriate understanding 
(or even a discussion) of how emergencies are discursively produced irrespective of the factual 
circumstances. Similarly, there is no treatment of the question of how the proposed 
constitutional solutions for emergency governance may have effects on the (de-)stabilization of 
 
 
security discourses that underlie the emergency situation. Here, legal theorists could learn from 
the Copenhagen School.  
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